Party, Race, and Neutrality: Investigating the Interdependence of Attitudes Towards Social Groups

Jordan Brensinger
Princeton University

Ramina Sotoudeh
[a] *Nuffield College, University of Oxford*
[b] *Leverhulme Centre for Demographic Science, University of Oxford*

Corresponding Author: Jordan Brensinger, Center for Information Technology Policy, Princeton University, 305 Sherrerd Hall, Princeton, NJ 08544; Ramina Sotoudeh, Nuffield College, 1 New Road, Oxford, OX1 1NF, United Kingdom.
Email: jbrensinger@princeton.edu; ramina.sotoudeh@nuffield.ox.ac.uk

Abstract
Recent public and scholarly discourse suggests that partisanship informs how people feel about social groups by organizing those groups into camps of political friends and enemies. More generally, this possibility implies that Americans' attitudes towards social groups exhibit interdependence, a heretofore underexplored proposition. We develop a conceptual and methodological approach to investigating such interdependence and apply it to attitudes towards 17 social groups, the broadest set of measures available to date. We identify three subpopulations with distinct attitude logics: partisans, who felt warm towards groups commonly associated with their political party and cool towards those linked to the out-party; racials, distinguished by their consistently warmer or cooler feelings towards all racial groups relative to other forms of social group membership; and neutrals, who generally evaluated social groups neither warmly nor coolly. Individuals' social positions and experiences, particularly the strength of their partisanship, their race, and their experience of racial discrimination, informed the ways they construed the social space. These findings shed light on contemporary political and social divisions while expanding the toolkit available for the study of attitudes towards social groups.

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Introduction
Pundits, pollsters, and academics regularly express concerns about America fragmenting into hostile subgroups (Fischer and Mattson 2009). Foremost among the potential lines of division has been ideological polarization. A considerable body of social scientific research attempts to model and measure the degree to which policy attitudes coalesce into fault lines in American society, generally finding limited evidence in support of such polarization (Baldassarri and Goldberg 2014; DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson 1996; Evans 2003; Fiorina and Abrams 2008).

Increasingly, however, lay and academic audiences conceptualize polarization in terms of affect rather than ideology. Journalists and public opinion researchers warn of growing animosity between Republicans and Democrats (Cohn 2014; Pew Research Center 2016). Observing trends in this direction, political scientists have begun showing how various factors like changes in party composition and partisan news media contribute to divergent feelings[1] about in- and out-party members (for a review, see Iyengar et al. 2019). Particularly concerning for scholars of social cohesion and fragmentation, this research suggests that party affiliation operates as a "mega-identity" (Mason 2018:14) that rouses out-group animus not only towards the opposing party, but also towards other social identities—such as race, religion, and sexual orientation—believed to be associated with that party's membership base (Ahler and Sood 2018; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Rothschild et al. 2019). Popular references to "white Evangelical conservatives" and "liberal coastal elites" (i.e., liberal educated urbanites) suggest

such alignment. Partisanship, so it seems, informs Americans' feelings towards a wide swath of social groups by conceptually organizing those groups into camps of political friends and enemies.

While these studies expand our understanding of the nature and implications of partisanship, they can give the impression that partisanship constitutes the dominant or even sole logic informing Americans' feelings towards various social groups. There are at least two reasons to be cautious of such a conclusion. First, not all Americans strongly identify with a political party, nor does partisanship necessarily offer clear affective signals to those who do. Independents and "cross-pressured" voters—possibly more than 40% of the population—may feel less attached or openly committed to, and therefore less likely to take affective cues from, either party (Baldassarri and Goldberg 2014; Klar and Krupnikov 2016). If so, political parties might assign various social groups to hostile teams, but only for individuals playing the partisan game.

This point raises a second, broader issue: Rather than dividing social groups into coalitions of political friends and enemies, individuals—perhaps even those who identify strongly with a party—might construe group affinities and antipathies in entirely different ways. They may conceive of society as split between racial insiders and outsiders (Kalkan, Layman, and Uslaner 2009) or morally honorable and reprehensible groups informed by their religious tradition, such as conservative Protestantism (Woodberry and Smith 1998). Understanding the logics organizing individuals' attitudes towards social groups in American society is more than an intellectual exercise: Those attitudes may promote or ameliorate discrimination, shape the possibilities for coalition building, and impact the propensity for inter-group antagonism, competition, and conflict (e.g., Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Carlsson and Eriksson 2017; Talaska, Fiske, and Chaiken 2008). Despite these issues, research on the interdependence of Americans' attitudes towards social groups remains rare.

We address this gap by investigating the structure of Americans' attitudes in 2016 towards 17 social groups, the broadest set of measures available to date. Importantly, this set of attitudes spans various types of social identities, including race, religion, sexual orientation, class, and political ideology, enabling us to identify largely overlooked interdependencies between these different types. We employ relational class analysis (RCA), a tool for detecting shared meaning structures that give rise to particular patterns of attitudes (Goldberg 2011). This methodological approach allows us to explore the potentially different ways that Americans construe the relationships between social groups in American society.

The rest of the article proceeds as follows. First, we consider theoretically-informed possibilities for the structure of Americans' affect and develop a conceptual account of the interdependence of attitudes towards social groups. Next, we use RCA to identify the underlying logics organizing Americans' attitudes towards the 17 social groups in the 2016 American National Election Study (ANES). Consistent with contemporary political discourse, we find that a substantial proportion of Americans—whom we refer to as *partisans*—felt warm towards groups commonly associated with their political party and cool towards those linked to the out-party. Yet two other classes of respondents also emerge: *racials* felt relatively warm or cool towards all racial groups—including whites and minorities—whom they collectively distinguished from other forms of social group membership, while *neutrals* tended to report neither warm nor cool attitudes towards all social groups. Following this initial observation, we explore the internal structure of these three classes. As the literature on affective polarization leads us to expect, partisans actually consisted of two diametrically-opposed poles aligned with groups traditionally associated with the Republican and Democratic bases. Racials similarly divide into two poles differentiated in terms of their members' relative warmth or coolness towards racial identities compared to other types of social groups. We interpret this divide—informed by research on racial diversity discourse (Bell and Hartmann 2007; Berrey 2015)—as

potentially evincing disagreement about the merits of racial identities. Neutrals exhibit no such internal division. Moreover, their neutral attitudes do not appear to reflect satisficing, a lack of entitlement to share political attitudes, or traditional social desirability. We therefore propose that their affective neutrality may, like identifying as a political independent (Klar and Krupnikov 2016), constitute a strategy for presenting themselves as agreeable at a time of perceived social and political division and animosity.

Finally, we explore the foundations of attitude logics by investigating the sociodemographic factors that differentiate partisans, racials, and neutrals. Having identified partisan and racial logics, we pay special attention to how partisanship and race relate to attitude logics. We show that the more individuals identify with and follow party politics, the more likely they are to view social groups in a partisan way. By comparison, neutrals are characterized by relative disengagement from mainstream politics and media. Yet political identification interacts in substantively interesting ways with race: while stronger partisanship generally equated with construing the social space in partisan ways, blacks with stronger party commitments were more likely to hold feelings organized around the distinctiveness of race. For their part, racials, especially those expressing coolness towards racial identity, were also more likely than others to have felt racially discriminated against in the past, signaling that experiencing racial discrimination may lead some individuals to take a dim view of racial identities.

Taken together, our findings complicate narratives of social fragmentation in American society. Partisan divisions, as anticipated by research on affective polarization, do appear to inform how many Americans evaluate ostensibly non-partisan identities. At the same time, the division of social groups into camps of political friends and enemies is not universal. A majority of Americans—including some who strongly identify with a political party—still do not construe the social space in partisan terms. This highlights the importance of allowing for heterogeneity in the structure of Americans' attitudes. Thus, our study also expands the conceptual and methodological toolkit available to researchers studying attitudes towards social groups. While existing research tends (implicitly or explicitly) to treat such attitudes as independent, we provide a substantively generalizable way of studying them relationally. Such an approach enables scholars to more fully appreciate the complex semantic relations between the various types of social groups characteristic of contemporary societies.

THEORIZING THE STRUCTURE(S) OF ATTITUDES TOWARDS SOCIAL GROUPS

Partisanship as "Mega-Identity"

Research on affective polarization—the tendency of Americans to dislike members of the opposing political party—points to the possibility that partisanship operates as a key organizing principle for attitudes towards a wide range of social groups (see Iyengar et al. 2019). According to this body of work, Americans may feel positively or negatively towards groups like blacks, Christians, or gays and lesbians because they conceive of those groups as affiliated with their or the opposing political party. If true, one would expect partisan individuals to organize the social space according to a logic that pits social groups associated with the Democratic and Republican parties against each other.

Scholars have offered two major explanations for the possibility of such densely-interconnected animosities. First, the affective links between partisanship and other social identities may result from increasing overlap between party and social group membership (Though such "social sorting" remains hotly debated; see Fiorina and Abrams 2008; Fischer and Mattson 2009). According to Mason (2018:28–43), by 2012, those who identified with conservatives, whites, the religious, businesspeople, and the American South were far more likely to consider themselves Republican than Democrat, a group linked to liberal, black, secular, poor, and non-

Southern identities. Such demographic alignment leads Americans to associate various social identities with partisan affiliation (also see Mason 2016; Valentino and Zhirkov 2018). As a result, "Democrats and Republicans have a lot more information about who their *social* and partisan enemies are" (Mason 2018:26; emphasis added).

Other scholars have suggested that the *actual* composition of American political parties is far less important than Americans' *beliefs* about their composition. According to this perspective, individuals conceptualize parties in terms of prototypes, collections of characteristics associated with each party's members (Ahler and Sood 2018). Cultural associations linking Democrats with the working class and Republicans with the wealthy have persisted since the early 20th century (Green et al. 2002; Rothschild et al. 2019). In addition, partisan prototypes now increasingly link racial minorities and people who identify as LGBT to Democrats while associating whites and evangelical Christians with Republicans (Ahler and Sood 2018; Claassen et al. 2019; Green et al. 2002; Hutchings and Valentino 2004; Rothschild et al. 2019). In a recent survey of 1,000 Americans on YouGov, Ahler and Sood (2018:966) found that respondents overestimated the proportion of party-stereotypical groups within each political party—including blacks, LGB individuals, and atheists in the Democratic Party and elderly and evangelical individuals and high-income earners in the Republican Party—by an average of 342%. While the parties may or may not be trending towards greater homogeneity, American voters *believe* them to be so. Our goal here is not to adjudicate between these two theories. Rather, we see both as anticipating that some Americans' attitudes towards social groups will exhibit a logic organized around partisan divisions.

Research remains scarce regarding how partisanship informs attitudes towards social groups more broadly. In an early investigation of polarization, DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson (1996) analyzed ANES feeling thermometer data regarding blacks, the poor, liberals and conservatives from 1974 to 1994. They found that Democrats and Republicans became significantly more polarized in their feelings towards liberals, conservatives, and the poor but not blacks. Evans (2003) reproduced these analyses including additional survey waves and found similar results. More recently, Westwood and Peterson (2020) found that negative experiences in experimental trust games with out-party members produced negative affect not only towards the other party but also towards the racial outgroup (and vice versa). Though narrow in scope, these studies offer some support for how partisanship may organize the American social space.

Alternative Attitude Logics

Research on affective polarization offers support for the importance of partisanship in structuring attitudes towards social groups. But Americans may not unambiguously identify with or even care about either of the two camps at the center of mainstream political discourse—they may construe the relationship between social groups in an entirely different way. Baldassarri and Goldberg (2014:47–48) found that only about a third of ANES respondents organized their policy attitudes according to a liberal-conservative logic. Furthermore, Klar and Krupnikov (2016) argue that many individuals identify as political independents because they perceive the parties and their members to be angry and divisive; they reject party labels to make a good impression. These findings suggest that partisanship may not clearly organize attitudes towards social groups for all Americans.

We therefore briefly consider other principles identified by the existing literature that may organize attitudes towards social groups. These alternatives, including race and religion, should not be thought of as independent of partisanship—indeed they are not (Westwood and Peterson 2020; Wilde and Glassman 2016)—but they may organize attitudes towards social groups in ways not reducible to it. Our discussion of these alternatives, while necessarily non-exhaustive, motivates and informs our subsequent empirical investigation of attitude logics.

Race.—At least since Du Bois's ([1903]2007) references to the "color line," social scientists have devoted considerable attention to the unique divisiveness of race in American society (e.g. Omi and Winant 2015). Racial ideology may therefore represent a primary principle organizing Americans' attitudes towards social groups. While numerous possible ideological configurations exist, we believe that two are currently the most prominent and widely diffused among the American population. First, a dominance-oriented race discourse pits whites against all racialized non-white minorities. Individuals may therefore feel similarly (whether warm or cool) towards all such minorities, clearly distinct from their opposing feelings towards whites (Edgell and Tranby 2010; Kalkan, Layman, and Uslaner 2009; Tranby and Hartmann 2008).

Alternatively, racial diversity discourse claims all racial groups as equally worthy and deserving of recognition. While diversity ostensibly pertains to a broad acceptance of social difference, in practice Americans primarily conceptualize it in racial terms (Bell and Hartmann 2007; Berrey 2015). Individuals who embrace the racial diversity discourse may therefore report positive attitudes towards all racial groups—whether minority or majority—while those critical of (but still oriented towards) racial diversity discourse may feel relatively cool towards all such groups, perhaps believing that affirming these collective identities undermines individualism, meritocracy, and American national unity (Alexander 2001; Bell and Hartmann 2007; Edgell and Tranby 2010). Unlike with the dominance-oriented racial discourse, though, both will report feeling similarly towards all racial groups.

Multiculturalism.—While most Americans tend to understand diversity in racial terms, some may divide the social space according to broader conceptions of multiculturalism. Recent scholarship, for instance, emphasizes a shift among educated and elite Americans towards ostensible openness to other social groups and cultures (e.g. Lizardo 2017; Ollivier and Fridman 2002), while others may articulate a more critical view of group affiliations. Both orientations to multiculturalism appeared among respondents to the American Mosaic Project, a majority of whom, according to Edgell and Tranby (2010:185), "do not appear to draw symbolic boundaries in public life on the basis of religious or racial/ethnic differences. Rather, symbolic boundaries appear to be drawn on the basis of attitudes towards diversity and difference *in general*."

Religion.—Finally, religion may also inform how some individuals construe the American social space. Indeed the considerable popular and scholarly attention devoted to the so-called "culture wars" focused on perceived schisms rooted in faith and family (Fischer and Mattson 2009). Following this line, the most likely attitude logic appears to be one organized around social groups' perceived relationship to conservative Protestant morality. Such a logic would pit Christians and perhaps Jews in opposition to groups viewed as "immoral," such as atheists, Muslims, gays and lesbians, and feminists (Edgell et al. 2016, 2006; Woodberry and Smith 1998). In response to the perceived intolerance of this worldview, other individuals may hold largely positive attitudes towards the latter groups while feeling coolly towards Christians and fundamentalists (Bolce and De Maio 1999).

Our discussion of these alternative attitude structures serves as an overview intended to broaden the horizon of possibilities beyond partisanship to include other theoretically-informed alternatives. The logics we consider are neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive. To identify the actual logics undergirding Americans' attitudes towardstoward social groups, we require an analytic approach suited to the task. We turn to that issue now.

A RELATIONAL APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF ATTITUDES TOWARD SOCIAL GROUPS

A considerable body of research in the social sciences investigates attitudes toward social groups, particularly minority or non-normative groups. Much of this work has focused on Americans' feelings toward racial groups—especially African Americans (e.g., Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Danigelis, Hardy, and Cutler 2007; DiMaggio et al. 1996; Quillian 1996; Schuman et al. 1997)—and members of political parties (DiMaggio et al. 1996; Evans 2003; Iyengar et al. 2019), but scholars have also investigated attitudes toward immigrants (Alba, Rumbaut, and Marotz 2005; Quillian 1995), women (Danigelis et al. 2007; Jackman and Muha 1984), religious groups (Bolce and De Maio 1999; Edgell et al. 2006; Edgell et al. 2016), members of the LGBTQ community (Adamczyk and Pitt 2009; Grollman 2017; Wilson 1994), and economic groups, including poor and homeless people (DiMaggio et al. 1996; Jackman and Muha 1984; Phelan et al. 1995).

Within this immense body of research, scholars generally treat attitudes as independent, thereby assuming that all individuals understand those attitudes in the same way. This assumption commonly takes two forms. First, many (although not all) researchers conceptualize attitudes as *discrete*: an individual's attitudes toward one type of identity, say race, do not relate to, shape, or constrain attitudes associated with other identities, such as those informed by political or religious affiliation. While this approach enables scholars to study the effects of sociodemographic factors on particular attitudes, it comes at the cost of treating attitudes toward groups, such as those based on race, gender, or class, as if they exist in isolation. Key studies on prejudice and tolerance have long cast doubt on this dominant approach by showing how prejudice generalizes across out-groups (Adorno et al. 1950; Allport [1954] 1979; Dovidio, Glick, and Rudman 2005; McFarland 2010). Yet by attributing attitude interdependence to underlying personality traits and ideological orientations, such as authoritarianism and conformity, such studies still tend to hold constant the underlying relationship between attitudes; individuals will exhibit either prejudice or more tolerant or positive attitudes toward all groups (but see Meuleman et al. 2019).

This limitation partly results from the second way that researchers often conceptualize attitudes: they theorize and model them *dyadically*, as relations between in-groups and out-groups. Research commonly explores how Whites feel about Blacks, men about women, Democrats about Republicans, or the non-poor about the poor (e.g., Jackman and Muha 1984; Klar, Krupnikov, and Ryan 2018; Quillian 1996). Yet, as scholars of intersectionality have shown, social life is considerably more complicated than this, with many (if not most) identities inadequately represented by a two-group paradigm (Best et al. 2011; Collins 2015). As a result, sociologists have begun to problematize this dyadic approach to group relations. Abascal (2015), for instance, demonstrated experimentally how Black and White individuals' attitudes and behaviors toward each other changed when primed about Hispanic population growth—a multigroup paradigm. Going beyond race, Daenekindt, de Koster, and van der Waal (2017) show how some segments of the Dutch public construe cultural attitudes—including toward groups like Turks, Muslims, and homosexuals alongside other topics like religious orthodoxy—as strongly linked, whereas for others those same attitudes appear largely unrelated. Studies like these have begun to show that attitudes neither have constant meanings nor exist in a vacuum. We build on these insights by focusing on how attitudes toward social groups are structured within a social space marked by many groups spread across multiple types of identities.

Shifting to a more relational approach has analytic implications. Researchers typically model attitudes toward social groups independently as a function of individual-level predictors (Lee, Farrell, and Link 2004; Phelan et al. 1995; Sullivan and Ghara 2015) or macro-level factors (Hiers, Soehl, and Wimmer 2017; Quillian 1995). However, two individuals with similar sociodemographic profiles might hold the same attitude for very different reasons, and in concert with a very different set of attitudes. Muslims can be construed as cultural outsiders or a

racial minority group (Kalkan et al. 2009); Hispanics can be construed in both racial terms (as "non-whites/non-blacks") and national ones (as "non-Americans") (Abascal 2015:791).

Consider four hypothetical respondents asked about their feelings toward a handful of social groups (see Figure 1). Individual A reports especially positive feelings toward conservatives, indifference toward Black people, and strong dislike for Muslims and gays and lesbians. Individual B feels similarly to A, but somewhat moderated. Individual C vehemently dislikes conservatives, but feels quite warmly toward Black people, Muslims, and gays and lesbians. This third respondent holds feelings opposed to the first two respondents, but all three largely agree on the underlying relationships between social groups; their attitudes appear to track contemporary partisan political discourse, which positions conservatives in opposition to Muslims and gays and lesbians while offering a somewhat murkier picture about race. Now consider a fourth respondent, Individual D, who feels warmly toward conservatives and gays and lesbians, but cool toward Blacks and Muslims. This respondent does not appear to hold feelings informed by dominant partisan discourse, but instead opposition to racialized "others." Together, these patterns illustrate the importance of considering the relationships between attitudes. Individuals may report opposing attitudes (e.g., Individuals A and C), yet agree on the logic organizing those attitudes. Similarly, they may express similar attitudes toward a given social group (e.g., Individuals A, B, and D toward conservatives), but for different reasons that only become discernable in the relations between attitudes.

[Figure 1 about here]

This possibility aligns with a substantial body of social science research on the interdependence of attitudes more generally. With respect to public opinion, social scientists dating back at least to the mid-twentieth century have conceptualized political beliefs in network terms (Converse 1964) and have recently begun to study the structure of such beliefs inductively using network analytic methods (Baldassarri and Goldberg 2014; Boutyline and Vaisey 2017; DellaPosta 2020; DiMaggio and Goldberg 2018). In a similar fashion, cultural analysts more broadly have embraced relational approaches to meaning (Boutyline 2017; DiMaggio et al. 2018; Goldberg 2011; Mohr 1998). According to DellaPosta (2020:512), this collective body of work on public opinion and culture exemplifies "the shift from studying distributions of particular beliefs or even correlations among pairs of beliefs to representing the overall *structure* of beliefs in relation to one another. Rather than describing particular beliefs, the key question concerns how various beliefs cohere into a larger network and the structural properties of that network."

Although fruitful for the study of public opinion and "culture" writ large, why conceptualize attitudes toward social groups relationally? Recent work by social psychologists (e.g., Brewer and Kramer 1985; Landau, Meier, and Keefer 2010) and political scientists (Halpern and Rodrıguez 2018; Westwood and Peterson 2020) supports the notion that attitudes toward social groups are shaped by cultural and relational mechanisms. In particular, research on attitude generalization and secondary transfer effects—that is, when real or imagined contact with one out-group produces change in attitudes toward other out-groups—demonstrates that consciously or subconsciously perceiving two groups to be similar can link attitudes toward those groups, even across ostensibly different types of identities (for reviews, see Crisp and Turner 2012; Glaser et al. 2015; Lolliot et al. 2012). Most significantly, Harwood and colleagues (2011:182) offer experimental evidence that "attitudes are organized in some sort of semantic network, and that changes to one attitude will generalize to others that are proximal in the network but will not affect ones that are more distant." In their study, participants asked to imagine positive contact with illegal immigrants reported warmer feelings toward a range of other out-groups, including Mexican Americans, Asian Americans, homeless people, and Democrats, with greater effects for groups independently judged to be more similar to illegal immigrants. These findings highlight the promise of network approaches to the study of attitudes toward social groups.

Existing approaches that treat attitudes toward social groups as independent cannot account for broader dynamics of group interconnectedness characteristic of typically complex social spaces like contemporary American society. We therefore aim to expand the conceptual and analytic toolkit of scholars studying attitudes toward social groups by linking that research stream to the growing body of work on the interconnectedness of attitudes. Following Harwood and colleagues (2011), we conceptualize attitudes toward social groups as constituting semantic networks, where the meanings individuals attach to groups link those groups to one another to varying degrees. Within the network, groups perceived to be more similar will occupy similar affective positions, and others will be more affectively distant or disconnected. Yet our approach also acknowledges that individuals may construe the relationships between social groups in fundamentally different ways. To allow for this heterogeneity, and to identify the logics that underpin patterns of group attitudes, we require broad data along with methods that can model the relationships between attitudes as they vary among people.

MODELING ATTITUDE INTERDEPENDENCE: DATA AND METHODS

For our analyses, we draw on data from the 2016 American National Election Studies (ANES). The ANES is a publicly available, full-probability survey of eligible American voters conducted at the time of most presidential and midterm elections. Our analyses focus on a set of "feeling thermometer" questions that ask respondents to report their feelings toward various social groups on a scale from 0 to 100, with values greater than 50 corresponding to "warm" feelings, less than 50 to "cool" feelings, and 50 to neither warm nor cool affect. We arrived at 17 such questions after excluding some on the basis that they conflate individuals and social or political institutions (e.g., "the police"). Figure 2 lists the resulting set of social groups used in the analysis, loosely characterized by type of identity. Information on feeling thermometer wording and other variables used in our analyses can be found in Part A of the online supplement.

[Figure 2 about here]

To discern the structure(s) of attitudes toward social groups in the United States in 2016, we use relational class analysis (RCA) to help uncover classes of respondents whose attitudes exhibit a common underlying logic. These classes may include individuals who hold quite different—even diametrically opposed—attitudes. Rather than only identifying people who feel the same way about social groups, RCA enables us to detect similar *patterns* of feelings toward social groups.

For the purposes of running RCA, we mean-center the feeling thermometer data by row,[2] normalize variables, and recode them into a nine-point scale.[3] We draw on Goldberg's (2011) basic framework for RCA but update the eigenvector-based algorithm for network community detection with the best such method available in R's *igraph* package—the Louvain method of community detection (Blondel et al. 2008). The RCA algorithm partitions respondents into groups using a three-step process (for a more formal elaboration of these steps, see Goldberg 2011).

First, it calculates *relationality*, a measure of the degree to which individuals' responses exhibit a shared pattern.[4] To do so, the algorithm constructs a matrix of the differences between response values for a given respondent. Next, resulting matrices of within-respondent differences are compared for all pairs of respondents. Relationality ranges from –1 to 1, with values of 1 indicating that two respondents share an identical response pattern, and –1 indicating a perfectly, diametrically-opposed response pattern. The algorithm calculates relationality for each pair of respondents in the data, producing a square matrix.

Second, RCA then takes the absolute value of that matrix, such that pairs of respondents with similar and opposite response patterns receive the same values. Finally, the algorithm graphs relationality as a weighted network and uses the Louvain method for community detection to identify groups in the network structure, the number of which is determined by maximizing within-group and minimizing between-group relationality. In line with previous research using RCA (Baldassarri and Goldberg 2014; Goldberg 2011), we handle missing data by using list-wise deletion, because imputation assumes a linear relationship in direct conflict with our relational approach to analyzing attitudes.

As stated earlier, because RCA takes the relationship between attitudes (and not the attitude values themselves) as the basis of structuring the data, it may assign individuals with opposing attitudes to the same class. This feature facilitates identifying interdependencies among attitudes, but it potentially complicates interpretation of the actual attitudes within classes and the sociodemographic foundations of those attitudes. If classes in fact include individuals with opposing attitudes, efforts to describe and model classes and their members will likely average out or confound such differences. To facilitate interpretation, we therefore pair RCA with principal component analysis (PCA). Because the first principal component constitutes the linear combination of variables that captures the most variance in the data, we can use that component to identify bimodality in response patterns (DiMaggio and Goldberg 2018). To detect such bimodality, we construct scales using PC projection—summing, for each respondent, their responses weighted by the dominant factor loadings—and plot the resulting scales. We then split classes evincing bimodality into two subgroups at the means of their respective scales. This analysis complements the RCA results by allowing us to detect which of the classes consist of two poles with opposing views (say, hostile partisan camps) but who implicitly agree on what divides them (partisan antipathy). Doing so also allows us to analytically distinguish between those poles when exploring members' attitudes and sociodemographic profiles.

Our methodological approach is fundamentally inductive. RCA and PCA furnish statistical groupings, but labeling RCA classes as attitude "logics"[5] and making sense of any associated poles necessitates interpretive decisions about the meaningfulness of those groupings. Our interpretive process involved triangulating between statistical analyses and existing theory. First, we identified patterns of relationships between attitudes shared across class members. We then turned to extant theory for insights regarding the potential significance of the patterns we identified. Theory, in turn, furnished additional expectations for the classes, which we evaluated with additional statistical analyses, including PCA and regression analyses. Ultimately, we strove for parsimonious interpretations of the overarching patterns exhibited by each class, focusing on the structures of opposition that define each class.

ATTITUDES TOWARD SOCIAL GROUPS IN 2016

Identifying Attitude Logics

We begin by examining the patterns in Americans' attitudes toward social groups in 2016. RCA partitioned respondents into three classes based on the relationships between attitudes.[6] We visually represent the strength and direction of all statistically significant relationships ($p < .05$) in the network graphs and heatmaps in Figure 3 (for actual correlation values, see Appendix Figure A1). In what follows, we offer initial interpretations of the three classes grounded in a close reading of the correlations before investigating their underlying attitudes and respective sociodemographic profiles in greater detail.

[Figure 3 about here]

Partisan logic. In the first class (38 percent of respondents), most of the attitudes toward social groups in the heatmap separate into two distinct and opposed clusters. One cluster consists of conservatives, Christians, Christian fundamentalists, White people, and the rich; the other includes liberals, feminists, illegal immigrants, Muslims, and LGBT people. Within each cluster, attitudes are strongly positively correlated; between clusters, attitudes exhibit strong negative correlations. As such, a member of this class who reports warm feelings about conservatives and rich people, among others, is likely to feel relatively cool toward liberals and people who identify as LGBT (and vice versa). To a lesser extent, attitudes toward Asian American, Black, and Hispanic people align with the latter cluster, seemingly due to a slight negative correlation with the apparently conservative cluster. This suggests that while expressed feelings toward racial minorities do not entirely conform to the same clear partisan divide as other attitudes, this logic nevertheless exhibits a racial dimension, with attitudes toward White people and associated groups somewhat opposed to those of racial minorities and other racialized groups, like illegal immigrants and Muslims (a point we revisit briefly below). Overall, the division exhibited in this class appears closely aligned with many Americans' beliefs about the respective compositions of the Republican and Democratic parties (Ahler and Sood 2018; Rothschild et al. 2019). We therefore tentatively refer to this class as the *partisan logic* and its members as *partisans.*

If partisanship indeed organizes partisans' attitudes, we should expect a stronger relationship between party identification and attitudes in this logic compared to the other two classes. As an initial test of this proposition, we examined the within-class correlations between party identification and each of the attitudes toward social groups, plotted in Figure 4. Visual inspection of this plot indicates that for 16 of the 17 social groups, respondents' attitudes correlate more strongly with party identification in the partisan logic. Only attitudes toward poor people—a group that falls outside the logic's two major clusters—fail to conform to this pattern. This evidence offers initial support for our partisan interpretation of this logic.

[Figure 4 about here]

Racial logic. Unlike adherents to the partisan logic, members of the second class (34 percent of respondents) do not assign social groups to two competing camps. Rather, the heatmap in Figure 3 shows that the central distinction in this class revolves around attitudes toward the primary racial groups in American public discourse—Asian Americans, Blacks, Hispanics, and Whites. Those groups form a cohesive cluster with strong intercorrelations, with illegal immigrants on the cluster's periphery, possibly due to the racialization of illegal immigrants (García 2017). Note that class members do not appear to pit Whites and minority groups against each other, as our theoretical discussion of the dominance-oriented racial discourse suggested, but instead group them together in a manner more aligned with mainstream racial diversity discourse.

At the same time, the racial cluster is weakly repelled by all other attitudes. Individuals who feel warmer (cooler) toward racial groups tend to feel somewhat cooler (warmer) toward other groups. The latter (nonracial) groups, however, lack consistent intercorrelations. Attitudes toward gays/lesbians and transgender people, for instance, are positively correlated (which is true in all classes). But although they exhibit positive associations with Jews, and Jews with Christians, Christians are negatively associated with gays/lesbians and transgender people. Similar imbalances, as well as nonsignificant correlations, abound among nonracial groups in this class, contributing to an overall picture that racial attitudes are more structured than nonracial ones.

The combination of strong positive relationships between racial groups and weak negative relationships to a relatively undifferentiated array of other groups suggests this class is organized around differentiating race from other principles of group membership. We therefore

refer to this class as the *racial logic* and its members as *racials* to connote their concern—positive or negative—with racial identities. By calling this class the racial logic, we do not mean to suggest this is the only class for which race matters—indeed, we saw hints of opposition between Whites and racial minorities in the partisan logic. Rather, we aim to highlight how, unlike the partisan logic, race constituted the *central* organizing principle in this class. We offer further support for this interpretation below when exploring within-class attitudinal dynamics.

Of note, attitudes toward Jews and Muslims do not cluster with racial attitudes despite both groups having racial or racialized connotations. Members of this class may understand Jews and Muslims in primarily religious, rather than racial/ethnic, terms. Whatever the reason, they do not tend to associate those groups with Asian Americans, Blacks, Hispanics, and Whites.

Neutral logic. Finally, a third class (28 percent of respondents) shows little to no clustering or correlation among feelings toward different groups. This lack of high positive or negative correlations could result from two different empirical patterns. On the one hand, respondents' attitudes could exhibit relationships that diverge widely from one another, thereby attenuating average correlations. On the other hand, if class members hold substantially similar attitudes toward all social groups, correlations between those attitudes will also tend toward zero because of the lack of variation in their attitudes.

We evaluate these two possibilities by visually inspecting attitude density plots and comparing the standard deviations and average feelings for the different logics. Density plots, shown in Figure 5, exhibit a noticeable peak at 50 for all 17 attitudes in this class and a mode of 50 for all but two (Christians and scientists). At the same time, individual respondents' attitudes and average attitudes for the class tend to cluster more closely together than in other classes (i.e., the class has a lower standard deviation of within-individual responses and standard deviation of mean attitudes; see Table 1). Compared to other classes, respondents in this class are more likely to report feelings on or near 50. We interpret this to mean that, rather than lacking any coherent structure, this class reflects a *neutral logic* according to which individuals—*neutrals*—generally report feeling neither warm nor cool toward social groups.

[Figure 5 about here]
[Table 1 about here]

The Substance of Attitude Logics

Americans' attitudes toward the 17 social groups in our analysis exhibit three distinct underlying logics, one structured around partisan politics, one around race, and the last around affective neutrality. Because these logics pertain to relationships between attitudes, however, they may conceal substantial heterogeneity in terms of individuals' reported attitudes. How do respondents conforming to each of these logics actually feel toward the social groups under consideration?

To answer this question, we first assess the possibility that logics consist of two opposing poles using principal component analysis (PCA). We interpret a bimodal distribution of respondents on the first principal component as suggesting an oppositional structure in the overall logic (for more detail on PCA, see Part F of the online supplement). Figure 6 depicts the first principal component for each logic as a scale. The partisan logic exhibits clear signs of bimodality. Although not as clear as in the partisan logic, the racial logic also appears bimodal, with one smaller and one larger pole. We therefore subset these two logics into poles by dividing their associated scales at their means. In addition to clarifying the content of attitudes in these logics, distinguishing pole membership will allow us to better examine their sociodemographic

foundations, because poles may have distinct profiles undetectable in aggregate trends at the class level.

[Figure 6 about here]

In addition to differences in their degree of bimodality, the partisan and racial logics differ in the extent to which the first principal component explains variation in their attitudes (see Figure S8 in the online supplement). In the partisan logic, the first principal component explains over 40 percent of the variation in attitudes among partisans. In contrast, the first principal component of the racial logic explains about a fifth of the variation in attitudes. This makes sense considering that racials exhibit little discernable structure in their attitudes beyond racial attitudes, and racial discourse is arguably more oblique than party politics.

Unlike in the partisan and racial logics, the scale associated with the neutral logic—as anticipated by our early interpretation—approximates a normal distribution with no clear signs of opposition. Due to this lack of bimodality, we continue to treat the neutral logic as a unitary class in all subsequent analyses.

Having divided the partisan and racial logics into poles, we can now examine the average attitudes characterizing each pole. To understand how attitudes in each pole differ from the sample average, we first standardized attitudes such that attitude values reflect how many standard deviations a given respondent's attitude diverges from the sample mean (i.e., *z*-scores). We then calculated average standardized attitudes for each pole. Figure 7 depicts these standardized averages (for non-standardized averages, see Appendix Figure A2). The partisan logic consists of two groups of respondents whose feelings toward different social groups appear to align with popular discourses about the Republican and Democratic parties. We refer to these as the "conservative" pole (48 percent of partisans) and "progressive" pole (52 percent) of the logic. Compared to the average respondent in the sample, partisans in the conservative pole express relative warmth about conservatives, Christians, Christian Fundamentalists, White people, and the rich, and feel relatively cool toward liberals, gays and lesbians, transgender individuals, feminists, Muslims, illegal immigrants, and scientists. Members of the progressive pole express the opposite valences, with the two poles separated by 40 to 50 points on the feeling thermometer scale for most of the aforementioned social groups.

[Figure 7 about here]

Distinguishing between the conservative and progressive poles also clarifies the role of race in the partisan logic. Partisans in the conservative pole tend to report feeling warmer than the average sample respondent toward Whites, but they express average or slightly cool attitudes toward racial minorities. In contrast, progressives report warmer-than-average attitudes toward minorities and coolness toward White people.

In the racial logic, the two poles differ primarily in terms of their relative warmth or coolness toward racial groups compared to other forms of group membership, as anticipated by our earlier discussion of mainstream racial diversity discourse. In the larger pole, respondents report substantially warmer-than-average attitudes toward Asians, Blacks, Hispanics, *and* Whites and somewhat cooler attitudes toward most other groups, than the average respondent, hence our decision to label it the "race-affirming" pole (62.5 percent of racials). In the smaller, "race-opposing" pole (37.5 percent of racials), individuals' attitudes exhibit the opposite trend: substantially cooler-than-average attitudes toward all racial groups and slightly warmer attitudes toward other groups. In particular, they feel somewhat warmer toward Christians, Christian fundamentalists, Jews, and poor people than does the average respondent, perhaps suggesting a preference for Judeo-Christian religious identities in lieu of racial ones. Yet recall from the

heatmap in Figure 3 that although attitudes toward Christians are positively associated with Christian fundamentalists and Jews, attitudes toward Jews and fundamentalists are uncorrelated; Judeo-Christian religion does not constitute a cohesive principle organizing attitudes in this logic. Also note that attitudes toward gays and lesbians and transgender people, although positively correlated in Figure 3, do not differ substantially from the average respondent in the sample. These findings support our parsimonious interpretation of the racial logic as primarily centering on attitudes toward racial identities.

Do racials really feel similarly about all racial groups, or is that merely an artifact of RCA grouping together ethnocentric individuals who identify with different racial categories? When broken out by racial self-identification, respondents in both poles exhibit some ethnocentrism, consistent with a general tendency in all classes and poles for respondents to prefer their racial in-group (with the exception of White respondents in the progressive pole—the only group to report an average preference for out-groups).[7] Yet individuals in the race-affirming pole consistently report warmer attitudes toward all racial groups—including in-groups—than do those in the race-opposing pole (due to a small sample size, this difference is not significant for Asian Americans; see Figure 8). Moreover, with the exception of Asian respondents' attitudes toward White people, members of the race-affirming pole report warmer-than-average attitudes toward *all* racial groups. Likewise, with the exception of Black respondents' in-group attitudes, those in the race-opposing pole feel cooler-than-average toward all racial groups. This pattern cannot be explained by respondents' particular tendencies to use warmer or cooler parts of the scale. After all, individuals in the race-affirming (race-opposing) pole tend to treat other social groups relatively coolly (warmly). Such consistent treatment of racial groups—unlike the White/non-White divide characteristic of dominance-oriented racial discourse—supports our interpretation of the racial logic as organized around affirmation of or opposition to race as a principle of group membership.

[Figure 8 about here]

Although the neutral logic does not exhibit bimodality, the content of neutral attitudes also merits deeper consideration. We saw how neutrals tend to express neither warm nor cool feelings, a finding we interpreted as suggesting that neutrals refrain from positively or negatively evaluating social groups. However, there are multiple possible explanations for this tendency. Such neutral attitudes could reflect satisficing, that is, the tendency of some survey respondents to expend less cognitive effort by choosing seemingly acceptable or satisfactory answers (for a review, see Roberts et al. 2019). Alternatively, neutrals might avoid valence because they do not feel entitled to share their political opinions (Laurison 2015).

It is difficult to ascertain the cognitive or affective underpinnings of neutral responses, but we conducted three additional analyses to adjudicate between these competing theories. First, researchers commonly operationalize satisficers and politically reticent respondents in terms of greater tendencies toward "don't know" responses; satisficers ostensibly tend to report "don't know" to any difficult or uninteresting questions, whereas respondents who feel politically unentitled do so only to political questions (Laurison 2015). To test these possibilities, we modeled assignment to attitude logics as a function of "don't know" responses to non-feeling-thermometer questions (for more details on question selection and models, see the Appendix, Part C). If the neutral logic reflects satisficing, we would expect that, all else equal, answering "don't know" more often would increase an individual's odds of assignment to the neutral logic (compared to the partisan and racial logics). If the neutral logic instead captures a perceived lack of entitlement to share political opinions, then higher "don't know" rates on only explicitly political questions will correspond to greater odds of being a neutral. We find no clear evidence of satisficing or lack of entitlement; neutrals are more likely than partisans to respond "don't know" in general, and specifically to political questions, but the same is true of racials. Thus

partisans, not neutrals, are the class that exhibits distinctive (infrequent) rates of "don't know" responses.

Second, we leverage differences in survey modes to further evaluate the satisficing theory (for more details, see Part D of the online supplement). ANES used both face-to-face and online samples in 2016. Existing research suggests individuals are more likely to satisfice online due to the absence of social pressure or probing from a human interviewer (Heerwegh 2009; Heerwegh and Loosveldt 2008; Liu and Wang 2015). Thus if satisficing explains neutral attitudes, we would expect neutrals to be overrepresented in the online survey mode. We observe the opposite: neutrals are actually overrepresented in the face-to-face mode compared to both partisans and racials.

Is neutrality, then, merely traditional social desirability by another name—an artifact of respondents answering questions in front of an interviewer (see Heerwegh 2009; Krumpal 2013)? To rule out this possibility, we reproduced our post-RCA analyses on the online sample only. Our findings, reported in Part D of the online supplement, appear substantially similar to the main results. The logic of affective neutrality also emerges in the online survey. We therefore propose a new possibility, informed by research on how political independents reject party identification to make a good impression (Klar and Krupnikov 2016): our respondents may express neutral attitudes as a way to appear more agreeable at a time of perceived social and political division.

The Foundations of Attitude Logics

What kinds of people are likely to construe the social space according to these different logics? Sociodemographic characteristics occupy a central place in research on attitudes toward social groups. Scholars in this tradition, however, tend to model the relationship between social background and attitudes for single attitudes or types of identities. To better account for the heterogeneity in how individuals organize their attitudes toward social groups, we instead model the sociodemographic predictors of exhibiting particular patterns of attitudes.

We explore the foundations of attitude logics by asking two interrelated questions. First, *what factors differentiate partisans, racials, and neutrals?* To address this question, we model the odds of being assigned to a particular logic (relative to each of the others) as a function of political, racial, and other sociodemographic variables. Recall, however, that in the case of partisans and racials, RCA grouped together individuals who shared the same logic while holding opposing viewpoints. If, as seems likely, the sociodemographic foundations of those opposing viewpoints differ, this first modeling approach will likely attenuate the relationship between background characteristics and membership in the partisan and racial logics. We therefore follow up with an additional question: *What distinguishes partisans and racials in the different poles of their respective logics*?

We begin by exploring the foundations of class membership using multinomial logistic regression. Given the content of attitude logics, we focus on two factors that we expect to influence class membership: partisanship and race. First, because party discourse appears to organize the partisan logic, we expect individuals who more strongly identify with one of the two major political parties and those more interested in and abreast of partisan politics will be more likely to express attitudes consistent with that logic (see Ahler and Sood 2018; Levendusky and Malhotra 2016). Second, given the centrality of race to the racial logic and perceptions of diversity (Bell and Hartmann 2007), we explore whether racial self-identification predicts membership in the racial logic. Relatedly, Edgell and Tranby (2010) found that experiencing racial discrimination accompanied negative views of diversity as well as the belief that racial differences divide Americans. We therefore expect that more frequent experiences of

racial discrimination will correspond to higher odds of being a racial, particularly in the race-opposing pole.

Crucially, partisanship and race may intersect in ways that shape attitudes toward social groups (Westwood and Peterson 2020). Racial groups engage with party politics in different ways and for different reasons. Of particular consideration, Black people reliably identify as Democrats despite relatively high levels of religiosity and sexual conservatism. Scholars have argued that this affinity for the Democratic Party—which began with the New Deal and consolidated during the Civil Rights period—results from prioritizing racial inequality over other considerations when choosing a political party (Dawson 1994; Smith and Capers 2018; Wilde and Glassman 2016:413–14). Therefore, although we expect stronger partisanship will generally predict attitudes consistent with the partisan logic, Blacks with strong party commitments may be more likely to understand the social space in racial terms.

To test these expectations, we begin by modeling individuals' conformity to a particular logic as a function of the strength and direction of their partisanship, political interest, attention to news media, racial identification, and perceived experiences of racial discrimination. Table 2 reports odds ratios from the full model (in the online supplement, see Table S1 for an explanation of all variables, and Part C for robustness checks of model specification). Coefficients can be interpreted as the effect a variable has on the relative odds of belonging to one class versus another. As such, we present three different sets of coefficients, one for each potential pairwise comparison between classes.

[Table 2 about here]

Consistent with our interpretation of the partisan logic, we find that stronger party identification, interest in politics, and attention to news media all increase the odds of construing social groups in a partisan way. In contrast, neutrals appear to be characterized by relative disengagement from mainstream political discourse. Greater political interest and attention to news media decrease the odds of being a neutral compared to being a racial or partisan. Interestingly, although involvement in party politics tells us a great deal about how individuals construe the social space, it matters little whether a person is a Democrat or Republican. This suggests that invested members of both major parties generally agree on the *relationships* between social groups, even though we expect them to feel quite differently from each other.

With respect to race, identifying as Black increases the odds of being a racial (compared to a partisan or neutral) relative to identifying as White. Membership in other racial groups, however, does not distinguish how individuals construe the social space. Feeling discriminated against on the basis of one's race also increases the odds of being a racial (compared to a neutral). At first glance, the most politically engaged individuals (regardless of party) divide social groups into hostile partisan camps; among the less politically engaged, Black respondents and those who experienced more racial discrimination hold feelings organized according to the distinctiveness of race.

The intersection of partisanship and race complicates this seemingly straightforward picture. Modeling the interaction of these factors, we find that strong partisanship informs Black respondents' attitudes differently than non-Black respondents (see Figure 9; for information on the complete model, see the Appendix, Part B). While non-Black respondents who strongly affiliate with a political party have greater odds than co-racial independents of holding partisan attitudes, strong party identification *decreases* the odds of Black respondents being partisans relative to racials.[8] Unlike other racial groups, Black respondents with strong party commitments (i.e., Democrats, as few Black respondents identified as Republican) are more likely to divide the American social space into racial and nonracial groups than Democratic and

Republican ones. Although we cannot assess the causal direction of this relationship, it aligns with research contending that racial considerations motivate Black individuals to identify with the Democratic party (Dawson 1994; Smith and Capers 2018; Wilde and Glassman 2016:413–14).

[Figure 9 about here]

In addition to partisanship and race, individuals' broader sociodemographic backgrounds deepen our understanding of the attitude logics (for descriptive statistics, see Appendix Table A1). Beyond being less politically engaged, neutrals as a group exhibit few stark differences from the sample at large. They include among their ranks a somewhat higher proportion of Midwesterners and lower proportion of Southerners. Black respondents are underrepresented among them, and they tend to have less education than a college degree. Religiously, neutrals as a group are more Catholic and less Evangelical than their proportions would suggest. Overall, though, they do not appear very distinct, just as scholars have long observed about the sociodemographic profile of political independents (Klar and Krupnikov 2016).

Because we found that the partisan and racial logics incorporated individuals with contrasting attitudes, we modeled pole membership in those logics using binary logistic regression (see Table 3). Partisans who identify more strongly with the Republican Party have greater odds of being in the conservative pole than do their independent or Democratic counterparts. Similarly, older individuals, Southerners, Evangelicals, and more regular church attenders all tend to align with the conservative pole. In contrast, college graduates, high-income earners, and individuals who identify as LGB are more likely to hold attitudes consistent with the progressive pole.

[Table 3 about here]

Within the racial logic, age, class, and politics all help explain pole membership. On the one hand, younger, lower-income, and lesser-educated individuals and those with somewhat stronger ties to the major political parties and news media tend to align more closely with the race-opposing pole. That pole also disproportionately includes individuals who report more frequently experiencing racial discrimination, suggesting that such experiences may generate opposition to the principle of racial identification. On the other hand, older, higher-income, and college-educated individuals are all more likely to express attitudes consistent with the race-affirming pole. These findings echo research linking the dominant racial diversity discourse to institutions and positions of socioeconomic privilege (Berrey 2015).

In summary, for most individuals, closer association with party politics corresponds to viewing the social space as divided between conservative and progressive coalitions. Republicans, older people, Southerners, and conservative Protestants tend to hold feelings supportive of the former and cool toward the latter, whereas higher-income individuals, educated people, and sexual minorities take the opposite stance. For Black respondents, however, strong party (i.e., Democratic) attachments increase the likelihood of holding attitudes organized around the distinctiveness of race. Regardless of racial self-identification, individuals who report having experienced racial discrimination also lean toward construing the social space in racial terms. More specifically, they—along with the young and economically disadvantaged—express relative coolness toward racial identities, whereas their more educationally and economically privileged counterparts feel more positive about racial identities. Finally, apart from expressing less interest in politics and political parties, individuals who report neutral attitudes otherwise appear relatively indistinguishable from the wider population, much like political independents.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Political and Social Divisions in American Society

Contentious partisan debates over issues like immigration, religious freedom, racial equality, and LGBT rights give the impression that political parties and their members feel very differently about a wide range of social groups in U.S. society. Soundbites from politicians fuel such suspicions, as when Donald Trump's 2016 comment about "bad hombres" (Gurdus 2016) appeared to betray antipathy toward Hispanics, or Barack Obama's remark about "cling[ing] to guns or religion" (Fowler 2008) appeared to denigrate White working-class voters. Do such divisions inform the attitudes of Americans more broadly?

Our results demonstrate that in 2016, many Americans—nearly 40 percent of respondents—did in fact report attitudes suggesting broad partisan fault lines in the U.S. social space. These respondents appeared to divide U.S. society into two opposing camps—one composed of conservatives, Whites, rich people, Christians, and Christian fundamentalists, the other of liberals, feminists, LGBT people, Muslims, and illegal immigrants—corresponding to popular perceptions of the Republican and Democratic bases (Ahler and Sood 2018; Claassen et al. 2019; Green et al. 2002; Rothschild et al. 2019). Respondents expressed regard for groups associated with their own party and relative dislike toward those of the other. These findings add to the growing literature on affective polarization (Iyengar et al. 2019) by showing how partisan affiliations predict not only antipathy toward members of the opposing party, but also appear to structure feelings about a wide range of other social groups in U.S. society.

How does the size of the partisan logic compare to theoretical expectations about affective polarization? Researchers studying this phenomenon generally evaluate aggregate trends, assessing the average differences between in- and out-party feelings over time (Iyengar et al. 2019). In contrast, identifying the proportion of affectively polarized Americans at any given point involves subjective judgment about what constitutes a state of polarization (see Fiorina and Abrams 2008). Nevertheless, descriptive findings and some recent research help put our results in perspective. First, 87 percent of respondents in our sample identified as Democrat, Republican, or leaning toward one of those parties. Even if we remove leaners—who occupy a somewhat ambiguous position with respect to the major parties (see, e.g., Abrams and Fiorina 2011; Klar and Krupnikov 2016)—63 percent expressly affiliated with the Democratic or Republican Party. Regardless of how one classifies leaners, many more people identify with one of the major political parties than express partisan attitudes toward social groups.

Perhaps the partisan logic is primarily driven by individuals with strong party affiliations, as Klar and colleagues (2018) contend with respect to affective polarization. They found that between 20 and 46 percent of leaners and individuals with weak party affiliations, and between 60 and 80 percent of those with strong party affiliations, exhibited affective polarization (depending on how stringently they defined that concept; see Klar et al. 2018: Appendix 5). In our sample, 32 percent of leaners and individuals with weak party affiliations, and 53 percent of those with strong party affiliations, expressed attitudes consistent with the partisan logic. Thus, while the former falls within the range proposed by Klar and colleagues, fewer individuals with strong party commitments adhered to the partisan logic than we might expect. Moreover, only 52 percent of respondents in the partisan logic identified strongly with one of the two major political parties. It appears as if attitudes toward social groups in 2016 were less politically polarized than we would expect from attitudes toward party members.

Judgments about the extent of polarization aside, our analysis makes clear that partisan-inspired social divisions only tell part of the story. Over 60 percent of respondents did not divide social groups in U.S. society into partisan camps. Slightly less than half of these respondents—the most politically disengaged in our sample—tended to report feeling neutral toward social groups. To the best of our knowledge, research has not previously identified such affective

neutrality. When scholars have considered neutral attitudes, they generally theorize them as a form of cognitive satisficing or a perceived lack of entitlement to share political opinions (Laurison 2015; Roberts et al. 2019). Although we cannot rule out these two theories completely, our findings cast doubt on their relevance for explaining the neutral logic. Neutrals were overrepresented in the face-to-face survey mode, the opposite of what one would expect for satisficing, and were no more likely than racials to answer "don't know" to survey questions, a common measure in both lines of research.

At least two other explanations exist. First, perhaps neutrals really do feel neutral toward social groups in U.S. society. Considering their relative disengagement with partisan politics and the media, these individuals may be less encumbered or constrained by dominant cultural discourses, enabling their indifference toward most groups. We are somewhat skeptical of this possibility, especially because this group constitutes nearly a third of respondents. We therefore proposed an alternative interpretation of affective neutrality as impression management. Much like political independents, who avoid open expressions of partisanship to make a good impression (Klar and Krupnikov 2016), neutrals may opt not to evaluate social groups to distance themselves from the perceived divisiveness of partisan polarization and antipathy. This interpretation echoes work on social desirability (Heerwegh 2009; Krumpal 2013). Affective neutrality, however, does not appear to be a methodological artifact in the traditional sense, as this logic emerged both among respondents who completed the survey with an interviewer and those who did so online. Neutrality may therefore be a more persistent form of impression management. Future research leveraging experimental methods could further test this interpretation.

In addition to neutrality, we also identified a logic organized around distinguishing race from other forms of group membership. As we considered earlier, two racial discourses arguably prevail in U.S. society, one—racial dominance—organized around opposition between White people and minorities, and the other—racial diversity—around equal treatment and respect for all racial groups. In the racial logic we identified, respondents expressed feeling consistently warm or cool toward Asian Americans, Blacks, Hispanics, *and* Whites compared to other social groups, a pattern we interpreted as revealing individuals' affirmation of or opposition to racial identities. This pattern does not fit expectations associated with racial dominance—which more closely matched racial attitudes in the partisan logic—but may relate to racial diversity discourse. Americans typically speak positively of racial diversity, at least on the surface, but some critique that discourse for a variety of reasons, including its perceived potential to undermine individualism, meritocracy, or national unity (Alexander 2001; Bell and Hartmann 2007; Edgell and Tranby 2010). Attitudinal patterns consistent with both of these tendencies surfaced in our analysis, accompanied by distinctive sociodemographic signatures. Respondents with higher incomes and more education tended to express warmer feelings toward all racial groups, whereas younger, lower-income, and less-educated individuals, and those who reported having experienced more frequent racial discrimination, felt cooler toward those groups. These findings echo research linking support for racial diversity discourse to socioeconomic privilege (Berrey 2015) and suggest that negatively-charged racial experiences may leave individuals feeling critical of racial identification (see also Edgell and Tranby 2010). Theory on racial feelings remains scarce (e.g., Alberston 2020), so future relationally-minded research could test and further develop the links between diversity discourse and attitudes toward social groups more broadly.

Were the attitude logics we identified unique to 2016? Commentators and researchers alike have suggested that Donald Trump's presidential campaign and subsequent presidency harnessed and exacerbated a host of social and political divisions (Abramowitz and McCoy 2019; Crandall, Miller, and White 2018; Editorial Board 2016). Changes to the set of feeling thermometer questions over time prevent a conclusive assessment of this question, but we conducted tentative

analyses on a subsample of nine attitudes toward social groups from 1988 to 2016 (for a detailed discussion of these analyses, see Part E of the online supplement). In terms of our main argument—that partisanship is one, but not the only, attitude logic—those analyses suggest that logics consistent with the three identified above have organized feelings toward social groups for quite some time. We do observe what may represent a slight upward trend in the proportion of Americans adhering to the partisan attitude logic. Between 1988 and 2016, we found an 8 percentage-point increase in the proportion of respondents assigned to the partisan logic, with more Americans reporting such attitudes in 2016—the focal year in our main analyses and the culminating year of the first Trump campaign—than in prior years. This possible upward trend, however, appears largely driven by increases in the number of partisans beginning with 2004. Moreover, the racial and neutral logics varied more across years than did their partisan counterpart, with the racial and neutral logics reaching their respective peaks in 2012 and the early 2000s. These tentative results suggest that while the Trump campaign may have exacerbated partisan divisions in feelings about social groups, it does not appear to have caused them nor pushed them anywhere near universality. Researchers could undertake longitudinal data collection with a consistently broad and diverse set of social groups to more robustly examine trends in the logics organizing U.S. affect.

These insights all hinged on allowing for heterogeneity when studying attitudes toward social groups. Take the case of social-psychological research on prejudice and tolerance, which has long argued that prejudice generalizes across out-groups (e.g., Adorno et al. 1950; Allport [1954] 1979; Dovidio et al. 2005; McFarland 2010). This work gives the impression that individuals will exhibit *either* prejudice *or* more tolerant or positive attitudes toward all groups (but see Meuleman et al. 2019). In contrast, we allowed the meaning of attitudes to vary across the population, constituting unique "semantic networks" (Harwood et al. 2011) informed by shared understandings of the relationships between social groups. Consequently, we found that only neutrals report consistent attitudes toward all social groups. Of particular note, members of the progressive pole of the partisan logic—from whom research on education and liberal politics would generally predict positive attitudes (e.g., Jackman and Muha 1984; Phelan et al. 1995)—expressed warm feelings about members of their political coalition but took a dim view of those traditionally associated with conservative politics. We discerned these trends by including a broad array of social groups and allowing the relationships between those groups to vary across the population.

To study attitudes toward social groups relationally, researchers therefore need datasets that incorporate respondents' attitudes toward a large and varied assortment of social groups. To our knowledge, the ANES represents the most comprehensive existing battery of such attitudinal questions, including attitudes toward groups pertaining to a wide range of identities, such as those based on political ideology, class, race, and religion. Using a broad set of social groups allows researchers to explore the relationships between attitudes associated with different types of identities while avoiding the pitfall of ideologically asymmetric sets of measures, such as focusing only on groups traditionally disliked by political conservatives and the less educated (for a discussion of this issue, see Crawford and Brandt 2020).

Limitations

Our analyses are limited in a few ways. First, clustering methods like RCA can be sensitive to the set of variables that analysts choose to include as well as to the distance measures they use to compare respondents prior to clustering (Sotoudeh and DiMaggio 2021). In Part B of the online supplement, we examine the robustness of our results to a number of factors, including our choice of distance measure, the set of social groups included in our analysis, and sample selection. Our results appear fairly robust. Even so, we considered only 17 social groups, a small subset of the vast array of social groups in U.S. society. Inclusion of other social groups

may change the configuration of logics we identified. To explore this possibility, future work should consider expanding the set of social groups, for example, by including additional political affiliations (e.g., libertarians), religious groups (e.g., Mormons), educational identities (e.g., college graduates), "legal" immigrants, and so on. Traditional surveys can only accommodate so many questions, but one could imagine designing "wiki surveys" (Salganik and Levy 2015) to inductively identify social groups that are salient to survey respondents and, in turn, develop more comprehensive understandings of attitude logics.

Two other features of the ANES merit consideration. First, the ANES is administered at the time of national elections. Survey responses—including attitudes toward social groups—may therefore reflect a greater degree of political thinking or organization than at other times (Lee and Bearman 2017). As such, we suspect the 38 percent of respondents assigned to the partisan logic represents a high-water mark for the general time period in question. Second, as with other national surveys, the ANES captures self-reported attitudes that are subject to varying degrees of social desirability pressures or biases. The attitudes in our analysis pertain to different types of identities governed by unique cultural norms regarding acceptable public opinion. While it has become increasingly unacceptable to report negative attitudes toward racial groups, for instance, similar norms do not necessarily exist for identities rooted in partisanship (Iyengar et al. 2019) or religion (Edgell et al. 2006). More research is thus needed to discern the degree of biases with respect to the diverse attitudes in our sample.

Finally, the nature of our data and methods do not allow us to explore causal mechanisms underlying attitude logics. Our study aimed to identify configurations of attitudes and the sociodemographic profiles of those who hold them, but it is also important to understand factors influencing the formation and evolution of attitude logics, as well as the forces pushing or pulling individuals to express feelings aligned with them. In general, attitudes—and specifically the logics organizing them—are often treated as given in social science literature, leaving the processes that give rise to them and their change over time less well understood. Future research could address this gap by directly testing, for instance, the role of messaging from political parties or the media in producing the competing camps of attitudes in the partisan logic.

Ultimately, we believe the conceptual and methodological tools advanced in this article help shed light on the ways people think and feel about groups in increasingly diverse contemporary societies. For those with a partisan lens, party affinities simplify complex relations into camps of political friends and enemies. Yet partisanship is not the be-all and end-all; many Americans construe the social space in racial or neutral terms. Taking that diversity into account will prove crucial to evaluating the nature and extent of social fragmentation in the United States.

Authors' Note
Both authors contributed equally to this work.

Data Note
Replication data and code are available on Dataverse at [*insert final link to Dataverse*].

Acknowledgments
We are particularly grateful to Andreas Wimmer for invaluable guidance at various stages of this project. We would also like to thank Maria Abascal, Parijat Chakrabarti, Paul DiMaggio, Tom DiPrete, Bob Shapiro, Gerard Torrats-Espinosa, members of the 2017–18 Empirical Seminar at Columbia University, and three anonymous reviewers at the *American Sociological Review*.

APPENDIX
Part A: Respondent Characteristics

[Table A1 about here]
[Figure A1 about here]
[Figure A2 about here]

Part B: Modeling the Interaction of Race and Partisanship on RCA Group Assignment

Table A2 reports the full interaction model depicted in Figure 9. To account for the challenges associated with interpreting interactions in nonlinear probability models (see Breen, Karlson, and Holm 2018), we constructed Figure 9 using a simulation-and-prediction-based strategy for visualizing multilevel models (Hanmer and Kalkan 2013). The basic strategy is as follows: first, we estimate a multinomial model; second, to simulate uncertainty, we sample coefficients from a simulated sampling distribution based on the coefficients and the variance covariance matrix determined via the Hessian-matrix of the model; third, we predict the probability that any given respondent will belong to a logic by multiplying the coefficients drawn from the simulated sampling distribution with that respondent's observed values across the variables in the model; fourth, we take the mean and the quantiles of the simulated predicted probabilities and visualize them with line graphs evaluating how predicted probabilities vary in response to covariates of interest. We used the *MNLpred* package in R, which implements this approach (Neumann 2021).

[Table A2 about here]

Robustness of Results to Compositional Differences in Partisanship and Race across Classes

Because Black individuals more consistently identify as Democratic than do non-Black individuals, the interaction results reported in Figure 9 may be driven by compositional differences in race and partisanship in the different logics. To test this possibility, we repeat our analyses limiting the sample to non-Republicans (i.e., respondents identifying as independents, independent-Democrats, not very strong Democrats, and strong Democrats). Table A3 shows the results are comparable to those reported in Figure 9 and are therefore not driven by compositional differences.

[Table A3 about here]

Part C: Exploring the Neutral Logic through "Don't Know" Responses

Work exploring theories of satisficing and a lack of entitlement to share political opinions often investigates rates of "don't know" (DK) responses (Laurison 2015; Roberts et al. 2019). Although our primary set of feeling thermometer questions referred to a DK option (responses that got dropped from our analysis when we implemented list-wise deletion), the wording implied a lack of knowledge about the group rather than uncertainty about how respondents felt (for question wording, see Part A of the online supplement). As a result, respondents may have used neutral responses in place of DKs to satisfice or due to a lack of entitlement.

We calculated two types of DK rates for each respondent: (1) a general rate evaluated across every variable in the ANES for which DK was an option, and (2) a rate calculated only for explicitly political variables—including questions assessing respondents' political ideologies, attitudes toward Congress and the Supreme Court, and opinions on how public money is spent—as selected by Laurison (2015). Table A4 shows the precise list of variables we used to calculate political DK rates. We constructed DK rates by calculating the proportion of questions for which each respondent gave a DK. The only change between the two rates was the set of questions (all questions versus political questions) over which this proportion was calculated.

[Table A4 about here]

Table A5 extends Table 2 by adding to it the two DK rates described above. The results show that both DK rates increase an individual's odds of assignment to the neutral and racial logics compared to the partisan logic.

[Table A5 about here]

Notes

1. Following survey wording and the literature cited throughout, we use the terms "feeling" and "affect" synonymously with "attitude" to refer to people's reported feelings toward social groups.

2. Respondents vary considerably in the extent to which they use the feeling thermometer scales (Wilcox, Sigelman, and Cook 1989). Because we are interested in comparing the structure of response strings rather than their mean levels, we mean-center by row, which in effect standardizes respondents in terms of how they use the scale in question.

3. The ANES respondent card depicts nine labeled points (i.e., 0, 15, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 85, 100), which others have argued effectively converts the 101-point scale into an ordinal nine-point scale (Alwin 1997; Lupton and Jacoby 2016). We therefore transformed thermometers into nine-point scales such that 0–14 became 1, 15–29 became 2, and so on. We treated 50 as its own bin to preserve its neutrality, as conveyed in the question wording. These steps improved the fit of RCA to the data as measured by a structural equation modeling (SEM) approach (Boutyline 2017), detailed in Part B of the online supplement.

4. We used the method outlined by Sotoudeh and DiMaggio (2021) to ensure we chose the clustering measure best suited for our data. All the measures they provided were expected to perform exceptionally well on the data, especially relationality (with Louvain), correlation, eJaccard, and eDice. Relationality, however, considerably outperformed the other measures according to the SEM-based measure for evaluating group detection performance. In addition, we replicated our analyses using correlation class analysis (Boutyline 2017) and the original version of RCA (Goldberg 2011). Again, SEM suggests our version of RCA fit the data best (for details, see Part B of the online supplement).

5. Scholars have used schema, construal, and logic interchangeably to refer to the classes identified by RCA. We chose the term "logic" to highlight the organized nature of the classes RCA identifies. Furthermore, we felt logic presumes less about the cognitive underpinnings of classes than does schema.

6. Because Louvain's clustering measure is not hierarchical, we could not consult gap statistics, such as that used by DiMaggio and Goldberg (2018), to assess model fit. Instead, following Boutyline and Vaisey (2017) and Sotoudeh and DiMaggio (2021), we used SEM to compare the three-group clustering solution identified by RCA to a baseline model in which all respondents are treated as having come from a single group. Results, explained in more detail in Part B of the online supplement, show the three-class RCA solution better fits the data.

7. Because the ANES does not include feeling thermometer questions for Native Americans or individuals in the "Other" category, we exclude these individuals from this analysis. These groups represent .6 percent and 4 percent of the sample, respectively.

8. To check whether this finding constituted an artifact of comparing primarily Democratic-affiliated Black respondents to more politically heterogeneous non-Black respondents, we conducted similar analyses restricting the sample to non-Republicans. These additional analyses yield comparable results (see Appendix Table A3).

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

Figure 1. List of Social-Group Feeling Thermometer Questions
Note: The categories included here are for illustrative purposes only and did not inform the analysis.

Table 1. Attitudinal Descriptive Statistics, by Logic

	Mean Attitudes	Standard Deviation	Average Within-Individual Standard Deviation
Partisans	63.49	11.71	26.43
Racials	62.11	11.14	23.11
Neutrals	59.85	8.22	14.91
Entire Sample	62.01	10.29	22.12

Table 2. Multinomial Logistic Regression of RCA Class Assignment

	P(Partisan) P(Racial)	*P(Partisan) P(Neutral)*	*P(Racial) P(Neutral)*
Strength of Party Identification	1.484***	1.560**	1.051
	(.047)	(.050)	(.048)
Party Identification	1.045	.996	.953
	(.023)	(.025)	(.026)
Political Interest	1.390***	1.622***	1.167*
	(.067)	(.071)	(.067)
Attention to News Media	1.059	1.210**	1.143*
	(.054)	(.057)	(.056)
Experienced Racial Discrimination	.943	1.087	1.153**
	(.049)	(.056)	(.053)
Southerner	.910	1.178	1.296*
	(.097)	(.106)	(.105)
Black	.310***	.544*	1.757**
	(.199)	(.237)	(.205)
Asian	1.340	1.138	.849
	(.277)	(.282)	(.294)
Hispanic	.818	.979	1.197
	(.166)	(.182)	(.171)
Other Race	.692	.755	1.091
	(.229)	(.251)	(.232)
Female	1.094	1.046	.956
	(.094)	(.100)	(.099)
LGB	2.163***	1.975**	.913
	(.205)	(.225)	(.246)
Age	.996	.990**	.994
	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)
College Graduate	1.238*	1.215	.981
	(.102)	(.109)	(.111)
Income (2nd Quintile)	1.441*	1.313	.911
	(.161)	(.172)	(.165)
Income (3rd Quintile)	1.192	1.089	.914
	(.134)	(.144)	(.136)
Income (4th Quintile)	1.058	1.129	1.067
	(.166)	(.180)	(.174)
Income (5th Quintile)	1.232	1.257	1.020
	(.167)	(.180)	(.178)
Frequency of Church Attendance	1.019	1.094**	1.074*
	(.029)	(.031)	(.030)
Black Protestant	.470	1.208	2.570
	(.592)	(.793)	(.665)
Evangelical	1.329	1.427*	1.074
	(.163)	(.177)	(.175)
Catholic	.823	.711*	.864
	(.157)	(.163)	(.157)
Jewish	1.127	1.446	1.283
	(.332)	(.389)	(.407)
Not Religious	1.823***	2.203***	1.208
	(.169)	(.178)	(.179)
Other Religion	1.495	1.899*	1.271
	(.228)	(.257)	(.259)
Other Christian	1.281	1.108	.865
	(.164)	(.170)	(.169)
Constant	.121***	.054***	.446*
	(.320)	(.340)	(.324)
Observations	2,990	2,990	2,990
Log Likelihood	–3011.035	–3011.035	–3011.035
AIC	6130.07	6130.07	6130.07

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$ (two-tailed).

Table 3. Within-Class Logit Regression of the Odds of Pole Membership

	$\frac{P(\text{Conservative Pole})}{P(\text{Progressive Pole})}$	$\frac{P(\text{Race-Affirming Pole})}{P(\text{Race-Opposing Pole})}$
Strength of Party Identification	1.491***	.869**
	(.230)	(.059)
Party Identification	4.083***	.959
	(.448)	(.035)
Political Interest	.602**	1.060
	(.126)	(.100)
Attention to News Media	1.352*	1.114
	(.239)	(.084)
Experienced Racial Discrimination	1.143	.866**
	(.184)	(.058)
Southerner	2.106**	1.144
	(.651)	(.166)
Black	.440	.999
	(.282)	(.239)
Asian	.254*	1.299
	(.206)	(.607)
Hispanic	1.208	1.398
	(.582)	(.344)
Other Race	1.186	1.000
	(.864)	(.313)
Female	.842	.921
	(.258)	(.130)
LGB	.003***	.645
	(.005)	(.211)
Age	1.035***	.998
	(.010)	(.004)
College Graduate	.489**	1.310*
	(.157)	(.210)
Income (2nd Quintile)	.495	1.482*
	(.248)	(.336)
Income (3rd Quintile)	.511*	1.300
	(.205)	(.242)
Income (4th Quintile)	.283**	1.670**
	(.150)	(.404)
Income (5th Quintile)	.194***	2.094***
	(.103)	(.553)
Frequency of Church Attendance	1.616***	.975
	(.149)	(.041)
Black Protestant	4.643	1.501
	(25.417)	(.865)
Evangelical	7.924***	.720
	(4.213)	(.170)
Catholic	1.854	1.296
	(.920)	(.304)
Jewish	1.957	.199***

	(2.469)	(.111)
Not Religious	1.341	1.002
	(.723)	(.262)
Other Religion	.750	1.700
	(.491)	(.638)
Other Christian	9.814***	.839
	(4.978)	(.201)
Constant	.000***	1.539
	(.00)	(.720)
Observations	1,151	1,015
Log Likelihood	–175.449	–635.265
Akaike Inf. Crit.	404.898	1,326.529

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$ (two-tailed).

Table A1. Proportion of Respondents with Select Characteristics by Pole

	Partisans			Racials				
	Full Class	Conservative Pole	Progressive Pole	Full Class	Race-Opposing Pole	Race-Affirming Pole	Neutrals	Full Sample
Democrat[a]	.49	.06	.88	.47	.47	.47	.41	.46
Independent[a]	.07	.07	.08	.16	.14	.17	.16	.13
Republican[a]	.44	.87	.04	.37	.38	.36	.44	.41
Midwest	.22	.24	.19	.24	.25	.24	.28	.24
Northeast	.16	.08	.23	.15	.16	.14	.18	.16
South	.38	.50	.28	.41	.42	.41	.33	.38
West	.24	.17	.31	.20	.17	.22	.21	.22
Asian	.03	.02	.04	.03	.02	.03	.04	.03
Black	.05	.03	.08	.15	.19	.13	.06	.09
Hispanic	.08	.07	.09	.11	.09	.12	.10	.10
White	.80	.85	.74	.65	.64	.66	.75	.73
Other Race	.04	.04	.04	.05	.06	.05	.05	.05
Female	.52	.47	.57	.52	.57	.50	.53	.52
Lesbian, Gay, or Bisexual	.09	.00	.16	.04	.06	.03	.04	.06
Average Age	49.23	54.28	44.66	48.33	48.15	48.44	49.31	48.95
Less Than High School Diploma	.04	.06	.03	.07	.10	.06	.05	.05
High School Diploma or Some College	.47	.58	.37	.55	.60	.53	.58	.53
Bachelor's Degree	.27	.24	.31	.23	.17	.26	.22	.24
Advanced Degree	.22	.13	.30	.15	.14	.15	.15	.17
Income: 1st Quintile	.16	.15	.16	.23	.29	.20	.20	.19
Income: 2nd Quintile	.15	.14	.16	.15	.14	.15	.16	.15
Income: 3rd Quintile	.36	.42	.31	.34	.35	.34	.36	.36
Income: 4th Quintile	.14	.14	.14	.14	.11	.15	.13	.14
Income: 5th Quintile	.19	.14	.23	.14	.10	.16	.14	.16
Protestant	.15	.15	.14	.15	.14	.16	.16	.15
Black Protestant	.00	.00	.00	.02	.02	.01	.00	.01
Evangelical	.18	.32	.04	.19	.24	.16	.14	.17
Catholic	.17	.18	.16	.22	.17	.25	.26	.21
Other Christian	.16	.25	.08	.16	.18	.14	.18	.17
Jewish	.03	.01	.04	.02	.04	.02	.01	.02

Other Religion	.07	.03	.10	.05	.03	.06	.04	.05
Not Religious	.25	.05	.44	.18	.17	.19	.20	.21
N	1,259	602	657	1,124	422	702	909	3,292

[a] Partisan leaners included in the category they leaned toward (e.g., someone who reports leaning slightly toward Democrats will be classified as a Democrat here).

Table A2. Multinomial Logistic Regression Models of RCA Group Assignment with Interactions

	P(Partisan) / P(Racial)	*P(Partisan) / P(Neutral)*	*P(Racial) / P(Neutral)*
Strength of Party Identification	1.630***	1.637***	1.004
	(.089)	(.093)	(.056)
Party Identification	1.028	.986	.960
	(.024)	(.025)	(.026)
Political Interest	1.397***	1.634***	1.169**
	(.094)	(.116)	(.078)
Attention to News Media	1.061	1.208***	1.138**
	(.057)	(.070)	(.064)
Experienced Racial Discrimination	.958	1.096	1.144**
	(.048)	(.061)	(.061)
Southerner	.925	1.186	1.282**
	(.090)	(.126)	(.134)
Black	1.526	2.194*	1.438
	(.559)	(.954)	(.559)
Asian	1.293	1.405	1.086
	(.657)	(.744)	(.534)
Hispanic	1.144	1.172	1.024
	(.387)	(.414)	(.307)
Other Race	1.159	.702	.606
	(.494)	(.307)	(.233)
Female	1.104	1.043	.945
	(.104)	(.105)	(.094)
LGB	2.170***	1.981***	.913
	(.445)	(.446)	(.225)
Age	.996	.991***	.994*
	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)
College Graduate	1.249**	1.220*	.977
	(.128)	(.134)	(.108)
Income (2nd Quintile)	1.489**	1.336*	.897
	(.241)	(.231)	(.149)
Income (3rd Quintile)	1.214	1.105	.911
	(.163)	(.160)	(.124)
Income (4th Quintile)	1.093	1.147	1.049
	(.183)	(.208)	(.183)
Income (5th Quintile)	1.246	1.270	1.019
	(.209)	(.229)	(.182)
Frequency of Church Attendance	1.020	1.096***	1.074**
	(.030)	(.034)	(.032)
Black Protestant	.552	1.307	2.365
	(.331)	(1.039)	(1.576)
Evangelical	1.385**	1.461**	1.055
	(.227)	(.260)	(.186)
Catholic	.835	.709**	.849
	(.132)	(.116)	(.134)
Jewish	1.096	1.422	1.298
	(.366)	(.554)	(.528)
Not Religious	1.824***	2.191***	1.202
	(.311)	(.392)	(.216)
Other Religion	1.473*	1.899**	1.290
	(.338)	(.490)	(.335)
Other Christian	1.303	1.107	.850

	(.214)	(.189)	(.144)
Strength of Party ID x Black	.472***	.526***	1.113
	(.073)	(.098)	(.185)
Strength of Party ID x Hispanic	.830	.916	1.103
	(.130)	(.155)	(.169)
Strength of Party ID x Asian	1.053	.875	.831
	(.286)	(.239)	(.232)
Strength of Party ID x Other Race	.729	1.111	1.524*
	(.152)	(.267)	(.342)
Constant	.097***	.048***	.492**
	(.032)	(.017)	(.161)
Observations	2,990	2,990	2,990
Log Likelihood	–2997.516	–2997.516	–2997.516
AIC	6,119.031	6,119.031	6,119.031

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$ (two-tailed).

Table A3. Multinomial Logistic Regression Models Predicting RCA Class Assignment with Interactions (Non-Republicans Only)

	P(Partisan) P(Racial)	*P(Partisan) P(Neutral)*	*P(Racial) P(Neutral)*
Strength of Party Identification	1.011	.926	.916
	(.103)	(.101)	(.094)
Party Identification	.736***	.631***	.858*
	(.068)	(.062)	(.076)
Political Interest	1.402***	1.616***	1.153*
	(.127)	(.154)	(.099)
Attention to News Media	1.145*	1.237***	1.081
	(.086)	(.100)	(.081)
Experienced Racial Discrimination	.981	1.092	1.113
	(.063)	(.079)	(.073)
Southerner	.738**	.978	1.326**
	(.100)	(.146)	(.183)
Black	1.248	1.711	1.371
	(.503)	(.789)	(.546)
Asian	.612	.912	1.491
	(.353)	(.565)	(.790)
Hispanic	1.147	.924	.807
	(.443)	(.362)	(.268)
Other Race	.557	.365*	.656
	(.298)	(.196)	(.276)
Female	1.307**	1.096	.838
	(.169)	(.153)	(.110)
LGB	2.618***	2.057***	.786
	(.644)	(.537)	(.234)
Age	.984***	.979***	.995
	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)
College Graduate	1.692***	2.024***	1.196
	(.242)	(.314)	(.182)
Income (2nd Quintile)	1.386	1.272	.918
	(.283)	(.284)	(.186)
Income (3rd Quintile)	1.088	.854	.785
	(.193)	(.163)	(.134)
Income (4th Quintile)	1.055	1.034	.980
	(.239)	(.260)	(.228)
Income (5th Quintile)	1.733**	1.144	.660*
	(.399)	(.280)	(.162)
Frequency of Church Attendance	.862***	.909**	1.054
	(.036)	(.040)	(.042)
Black Protestant	.233*	1.554	6.657*
	(.188)	(1.961)	(7.068)
Evangelical	.613*	.848	1.383

	(.153)	(.229)	(.325)
Catholic	.605**	.644*	1.065
	(.135)	(.149)	(.229)
Jewish	.910	1.241	1.362
	(.391)	(.605)	(.715)
Not Religious	1.492*	1.912***	1.282
	(.340)	(.455)	(.306)
Other Religion	1.521	1.869**	1.230
	(.447)	(.593)	(.393)
Other Christian	.867	.974	1.122
	(.208)	(.245)	(.262)
Strength of Party ID x Black	.612***	.656**	1.070
	(.104)	(.129)	(.180)
Strength of Party ID x Hispanic	.841	.990	1.176
	(.153)	(.190)	(.199)
Strength of Party ID x Asian	1.575	1.073	.681
	(.512)	(.348)	(.222)
Strength of Party ID x Other Race	1.083	1.602	1.480
	(.292)	(.499)	(.404)
Constant	.929	.874***	.941
	(.042)	(.042)	(.042)
Observations	1,757	1,757	1,757
Log Likelihood	–1666.133	–1666.133	–1666.133
AIC	3,452.267	3,452.267	3,452.267

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$ (two-tailed).

Table A4. Variables Used in Calculation of Political "Don't Know" Proportions

Variable	Question
V161126	Where would you place yourself on this scale: Extremely Liberal to Extremely Conservative?
V161178	Where would you place yourself on this scale: Government should provide many fewer services to Government should provide many more services?
V162102	How would you rate: The U.S. Supreme Court?
V162104	How would you rate: Congress?
V161217	Do you think that people in government waste a lot of the money we pay in taxes, waste some of it, or don't waste very much of it?
V161207	Should federal spending on science and technology be increased, decreased, or kept the same?
V161209	Should federal spending on welfare programs be increased, decreased, or kept the same?
V161212	Should federal spending on protecting the environment be increased, decreased, or kept the same?
V161210	Should federal spending on child care be increased, decreased, or kept the same?
V161211	Should federal spending on aid to the poor be increased, decreased, or kept the same?
V161205	Should federal spending on Social Security be increased, decreased, or kept the same?
V161206	Should federal spending on public schools be increased, decreased, or kept the same?
V161208	Should federal spending on dealing with crime be increased, decreased, or kept the same?

Table A5. Multinomial Logistic Regression Models Predicting RCA Class Assignment as a Function of "Don't Know" Responses

	P(Partisan) P(Racial)	*P(Partisan) P(Neutral)*	*P(Racial) P(Neutral)*
Total "Don't Know" Responses	.989**	.982***	.994
	(.006)	(.006)	(.005)
"Don't Know" Responses to Political Questions	.786***	.717***	.912
	(.068)	(.064)	(.071)
Strength of Party Identification	1.465***	1.527***	1.042
	(.069)	(.077)	(.050)
Party Identification	1.042*	.993	.952*
	(.024)	(.025)	(.025)
Political Interest	1.358***	1.566***	1.153**
	(.092)	(.112)	(.078)
Attention to News Media	1.039	1.170***	1.126**
	(.056)	(.068)	(.064)
Experienced Racial Discrimination	.938	1.076	1.147***
	(.046)	(.060)	(.061)
Southerner	.915	1.185	1.295**
	(.089)	(.126)	(.135)
Black	.327***	.589**	1.800***
	(.065)	(.140)	(.372)
Asian	1.381	1.172	.849
	(.383)	(.330)	(.249)
Hispanic	.837	1.023	1.222
	(.139)	(.187)	(.210)
Other Race	.701	.773	1.102
	(.161)	(.195)	(.256)
Female	2.165***	1.974***	.912
	(.444)	(.446)	(.225)
LGB	1.115	1.078	.967
	(.105)	(.109)	(.096)
Age	.997	.991***	.994*
	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)
College Graduate	1.193*	1.148	.962
	(.123)	(.127)	(.108)
Income (2nd Quintile)	1.394**	1.259	.903
	(.225)	(.218)	(.150)
Income (3rd Quintile)	1.118	.996	.890
	(.152)	(.145)	(.122)
Income (4th Quintile)	.995	1.029	1.034
	(.166)	(.187)	(.181)
Income (5th Quintile)	1.151	1.140	.991
	(.193)	(.207)	(.178)
Frequency of Church Attendance	1.024	1.103***	1.077**
	(.030)	(.034)	(.032)
Black Protestant	.484	1.251	2.592
	(.287)	(.995)	(1.727)
Evangelical	1.357*	1.481**	1.092
	(.222)	(.264)	(.192)
Catholic	.838	.729*	.870
	(.131)	(.119)	(.137)
Jewish	1.174	1.530	1.303
	(.391)	(.595)	(.530)
Not Religious	1.844***	2.257***	1.224
	(.313)	(.404)	(.220)
Other Religion	1.507*	1.945**	1.291
	(.345)	(.503)	(.335)
Other Christian	1.312*	1.153	.879
	(.215)	(.197)	(.149)
Constant	.162***	.085***	.525*
	(.054)	(.030)	(.178)

Observations	2,990	2,990	2,990
Log Likelihood	6,110.734	6,110.734	6,110.734
AIC	–2997.367	–2997.367	–2997.367

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed).

Figure 1. Response Patterns for Four Hypothetical Respondents



Partisan Logic





Racial Logic





Neutral Logic



Figure 3. Attitude Networks and Heatmaps
Note: In these panels, we evaluate the relationship between social group thermometers for members of each class to assist in the interpretation of the logics underpinning their response patterns as identified by RCA. Within each group, we measure the correlations between group thermometers and represent these correlations in two ways, as a network and a heatmap. In the networks, nodes represent social group feeling thermometers, solid edges represent positive correlations between thermometers, and dotted edges represent negative correlations. The thickness of an edge corresponds to the strength of the correlation. Nodes are laid out using a force-directed layout algorithm that takes into account the direction and strength

of edge weights, seeking to put nodes with stronger and positive relationships near one another and ones with negative relations far apart, while minimizing edge crossing. Heatmaps visualize the correlation between social group thermometers via a shaded matrix. Darker shades represent stronger correlations. Positive and negative signs correspond to the direction of the correlation.



Figure 4. Correlation between Party Identification and Attitudes toward Social Groups
Note: Party identification ranges from "strong Democrat" to "strong Republican." Positive (negative) correlations therefore suggest that warmer feelings are associated with Republican (Democratic) identification.

Figure 5. Attitude Density Plots



Figure 6. Distribution of Scales for Dominant Factors





Figure 7. Mean *Z*-Score of Attitudes, by Logic/Pole
Note: Nearly all the differences between poles visualized here are statistically significant, which we evaluated with a student's *t*-test. In the partisan logic, members of the progressive and conservative poles differ significantly ($p < .05$) on all attitudes except for poor people; in the racial logic, members of the race-opposing and race-affirming poles differ significantly ($p < .05$) on all attitudes except for Muslims.

Figure 8. Racial Attitudes in the Racial Logic, by Self-Identified Race and Pole





Figure 9. Association between Strength of Party Identification and Attitude Logic, by Respondent Race
Note: Columns refer to individuals' class memberships and rows to their racial identities. Panels report the predicted probability of being part of the column class as a function of the strength of one's party identification. Members of the row race are compared to members of other races. Results show that as the strength of one's party identification increases, the probability of belonging to the partisan logic generally increases, and the probability of belonging to the other two logics decreases. Significance levels from the full model (Appendix, Part B) show this holds for all racial subgroups except for Blacks, for whom strength of party identification is positively associated with belonging to the racial logic and *negatively* associated with the partisan logic. For robustness checks for model specification, see Table S5 in the online supplement.

Figure A1. Attitude Heatmaps with Correlation Values



Racial Logic



Neutral Logic



Figure A2. Mean Attitudes, by Class/Pole